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Abstract 
Old Catholic theologians have often underlined the relationship between papal supremacy and infallibility and 
the priority of the former: The pope has full, supreme, and universal power over the whole Church, therefore he 
must be obeyed – at the same time, he may be obeyed, because he will not mislead the Church due to his 
infallibility. The article analyses this relationship, applying differentiations on two axes: On the one hand, 
Bocheński’s typology of epistemic and deontic authority, on the other hand, the notion of personal, formal and 
constitutional authority. The fact that the infallibility dogma of Vatican I considers papal authority at the same 
time as epistemic and constitutional, is identified as a major weakness of the dogma. The article will then 
approach the question how church leaders should practise their deontic authority in a context where their (and 
everybody else’s) epistemic authority is considered fallible. 
Keywords 
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Authority, the way it is understood in this article, is a quality of a person or body, who may be 
called the bearer of authority, which leads other persons or bodies to accept the said bearer’s 
statements and/or follow his/her instructions. These latter persons or bodies might be called 
followers of authority. The source of this quality, the difference between accepting statements 
on the one hand and following instructions on the other, as well as the question of acceptance 
or non-acceptance of claimed authority, will be discussed in this paper. 
Accepting authority and following its instructions implies trust that the authority does not 
err, or, in a weaker form, that the bearer of authority is less likely to be wrong than the 
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follower. However, neither claiming nor accepting authority guarantees that the bearer of 
authority is indeed right. This latter describes the notion of fallible authority: Those following 
the bearer of authority trust him, but still, the bearer of authority might prove wrong on the 
long run. What does such a notion of fallible authority mean in the context of Churches and in 
questions of faith? Or should theology, when considering the role of authoritative teaching in 
the Church, insist on infallibility in its ecclesial teaching practice? This paper will refute the 
notion of infallible teaching authorities by discerning different types of authority and applying 
this differentiation to the analysis of infallibility. 
Infallible Authority 
Thus, although my goal is to support the notion of fallible authority, my starting point is 
infallible authority – as it is defined in the dogmatic constitution Pastor aeternus from the 
council Vatican I.
2
 As an Old Catholic theologian, I love to start with Vatican I, not because I 
like its definitions, on the contrary; but because the rejection of this dogmatic constitution is 
the historical starting point of Old Catholic self-understanding and self-legitimation.
3
 
In the constitution Pastor aeternus, there are two aspects of papal supremacy: First, the 
jurisdictional aspect, which gives the pope supreme power over the whole Church.
4
 Secondly, 
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 First Vatican Council, Pastor aeternus, in Norman P. Tanner, G. Alberigo (Eds.), Decrees of the ecumenical 
councils (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), pp. 811–816. 
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 The early years of the Old Catholic movement and its self-legitimation as a Church is described by Johann 
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 ‘Wherefore we teach and declare that, by divine ordinance, the Roman Church possesses a pre-eminence of 
ordinary power over every other Church, and that this jurisdictional power of the Roman Pontiff is both 
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the epistemic aspect, which defines that the pope, whenever he acts as the supreme teacher of 
the Church in questions of faith or moral, and whenever he clearly expresses his intention to 
take a final decision and declare a binding teaching for the Church as a whole, he enjoys the 
infallibility that the Lord had promised to the Church. Such so-called ex cathedra teaching 
would therefore be considered as irreformable and permanent.
5
 On a terminological side note: 
Infallibility is a feature of teachers, not of teachings.
6
 Ex cathedra teachings are not called 
‘infallible’ by Vatican I, and rightly so: Ex cathedra teachings are truth claims in questions of 
faith and moral, the notion of ‘infallible teachings’would imply that they are somehow even 
more than just true, which does not make sense. Ex cathedra definitions are not ‘more true’ 
than any other teaching. Their truth claim is, however, guaranteed by the highest possible 
authority which can be neither withdrawn nor changed; thus, such teachings are rated as 
‘irreformable’ by Vatican I. 
In the pre-conciliar discussion, the debate was dominated by the latter of the two questions 
presented, which is the epistemic aspect of Papal authority: The notion of infallibility of the 
pope was by no means new, but fiercely discussed, in the 19
th
 century. It was, on the one 
                                                                                                                                                        
episcopal and immediate. Both clergy and faithful, of whatever rite and dignity, both singly and collectively, are 
bound to submit to this power by the duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, and this not only in 
matters concerning faith and morals, but also in those which regard the discipline and government of the Church 
throughout the world.’ Pastor aeternus 3, Norman P. Tanner and G. Alberigo, Decrees of the ecumenical 
councils (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), at pp. 813–814.. 
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God our saviour, for the exaltation of the Catholic religion and for the salvation of the Christian people, with the 
approval of the Sacred Council, we teach and define as a divinely revealed dogma that when the Roman Pontiff 
speaks EX CATHEDRA, that is, when, in the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, in 
virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the 
whole Church, he possesses, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, that infallibility which 
the divine Redeemer willed his Church to enjoy in defining doctrine concerning faith or morals. Therefore, such 
definitions of the Roman Pontiff are of themselves, and not by the consent of the Church, irreformable.’ Pastor 
aeternus 4, Tanner et al., Decrees, at p. 816. 
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hand, propagated by certain theologians, who underlined the importance of its definition by a 
council in times of doubt and uncertainty; while, on the other hand, critical voices against 
such a definition already emerged well before the council, Ignaz von Döllinger’s being the 
most prominent one among them.
7
 However, following the line of argumentation in Vatican 
I’s Pastor aeternus, it became soon clear that the two dogmatic definitions, papal supremacy 
and infallibility, are in a close relationship with one another, where primacy of jurisdiction 
comes first and infallibility comes second. 
The line of argumentation is the following: The pope has universal and immediate 
jurisdiction over the whole Catholic Church, such is the definition in chapter 3 of the Pastor 
aeternus. Therefore, the pope could lead the whole church astray, and there would be no way 
to stop him, no higher authority to appeal to. This could then lead Christians into a difficult 
conflict: They must follow the decisions of the pope, they owe them obedience, even if they 
consider these decisions as errors, as fundamentally wrong and maybe even heretical. This is 
where infallibility enters the argumentation: The pope being infallible under certain 
conditions, as chapter 4 of the Pastor aeternus defines, will not lead the Church astray. 
Whoever doubts an ex cathedra teaching by the pope, is wrong in doing so. Thus, the line of 
argumentation of Vatican I is, in short: you must follow the pope, because he holds the 
universal jurisdiction; and you can follow him safely, without fear to be led astray in your 
faith, because he is infallible. Therefore, Old Catholic theologians soon stressed that universal 
jurisdiction is the primary obstacle, while infallibility is just the ‘seal to the signature’, the 
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additional safety net that guarantees that the church will not fall into heresy when every 
church member does what is his or her duty, which is obeying the pope.
8
 
The Old Catholic protest against the Pastor aeternus followed different lines of 
argumentation.
9
 On the one hand, Old Catholics argued that the Pastor aeternus was not a 
legitimate conciliar decision: Infallibility was only put on the agenda of the council at a late 
stage, critical voices were ignored, there was not enough time for serious exploration of the 
issue, the rules of procedure discriminated against the minority bishops, and the final vote was 
not convincing, since a substantial number of bishops, representing about half of the Catholic 
faithful worldwide, had already left. On the other hand, Old Catholic protesters criticized the 
scriptural and traditional arguments put forward by the council. Finally, they did not confine 
themselves to refuting the argumentation of the council, but put forward evidence from both 
Scripture and tradition that neither the apostle Peter nor his successors were, or should be 
regarded as, infallible. However, they did not argue epistemologically against the notion of 
infallibility as such. It was Hans Küng who made such an epistemological line of 
argumentation the cornerstone of his famous book ‘Unfehlbar?’10 I will also follow an 
epistemological approach, but giving special focus to the question of authority. 
First Axis of differentiation: Authority by Expertise and by Command 
In order to analyse the authoritative claims by Vaticanum I’s Pastor aeternus, it is necessary 
to introduce several differentiations. Clearly, the two aspects of papal supremacy in chapters 3 
and 4 of Vatican I’s Pastor aeternus represent two different types of authority. The first is the 
authority of the boss; the second is the authority of the expert. These two types of authority 
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 Cf. Urs Küry, Die altkatholische Kirche. Ihre Geschichte, ihre Lehre, ihr Anliegen. 3rd edn (Frankfurt a. M.: 
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form the first axis of differentiation. They appear and re-appear in the philosophical discourse 
about authority under different names. The first one is sometimes called ‘administrative’ 
authority, or ‘executive’ authority; the second one is known as ‘cognitive’ or ‘epistemic’ 
authority. Roman Catholic philosopher Joseph Bocheński was the pioneer of this 
differentiation between two types of authority, he calls them ‘deontic’ and ‘epistemic’.11 
Since Swiss Old Catholic theologian Kurt Stalder, when discussing authority in the New 
Testament, referred to Bocheński and used his terminology,12 since other Old Catholic 
theologians including myself followed him and also adapted Bocheński’s terms,13 at least 
some Old Catholic theologians are familiar with this terminology. However, the terms 
‘epistemic authority’ and ‘deontic authority’, while they sound rather sophisticated, may not 
be immediately and intuitively understandable once you hear them. Therefore, I sometimes 
prefer another terminology introduced by Jean Goodwin: ‘authority by command’ and 
‘authority by expertise’.14 However, it is not the words that matter, but the differentiation in 
the subject matter. 
While Bocheński’s distinction touches the question, why people ascribe authority to 
someone, it rather aims at the consequences, not the establishing of authority: If you have 
authority by expertise, you know a lot about the subject matter in question, more than many, if 
not most, other people. Thus, others may be willing to believe that your cognitive statements 
within the field of your expertise are true. And this is exactly what the expert would expect 
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from others: the acceptance of the truth of his/her statements. Authority by expertise claims 
truth and expects acceptance of truth claims. – Authority by command is rather different. The 
authority of the boss does not want to make you believe his truth claims, but obey his 
commands. Authority by command does not speak in the form of cognitive statements, but in 
the form of orders. It does not teach, but it instructs. It does not claim truth, but obedience. 
There are, of course, possible objections against this differentiation between authority by 
expertise and by command: First, we want those in command to have expertise. People are not 
going to follow the instructions of a stupid boss. He who issues orders must know what he is 
talking about. A boss lacking authority by expertise will soon lose his authority by command, 
because no one will follow his orders, and the real experts will revolt. Secondly, obedience 
might seem like a far too submissive notion, which gives the bearer of authority almost 
absolute power, which is certainly not the way we want to understand authority – not in the 
churches, not in society, not nowadays. In an Old Catholic or Anglican perspective, there’s 
always an aspect of synodality in every authority, because authority needs to be accepted, to 
be received. 
I will come to these questions later. But for now, let me guide you a bit further in the 
footsteps of Joseph Bocheński, the above-mentioned pioneer of the differentiation between 
(as he calls them) epistemic and deontic authority. He describes authority as a relation with 
three variables: Person A has authority over person B in the field of question C. Thus, 
authority can massively change due to context, depending on the persons involved and the 
topic in question. In one room, every person present might be an authority on one topic or 
another; people differ in their fields of expertise, so whether you are person A (the one 
bearing authority) or person B (the one accepting authority) depends on C, the topic in 
question. This is obvious for authority by expertise; it is less obvious, but nevertheless true, 
for authority by command. Let me give you an example: At the Department for Old Catholic 
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Theology at the University of Bern, the head of the department is a priest in the clergy of the 
Old Catholic Church of Switzerland, while the bishop of the Old Catholic Church is a part-
time lecturer on practical theology at the Department. Thus, their relation in terms of authority 
by command depends on the context they meet: In administrative questions in the university 
context, the head of department has authority over the lecturer; in the church context, the 
relationship of authority changes, now the bishop assumes authority over the priest. 
Thus, we should give up talking about persons being an authority or having authority 
without any further markers, but make it our habit to express ourselves precisely: person or 
body A has authority over person or group B on the topic or in the context C. This is, by the 
way, reflected in the main topic of the Exeter conference where this paper was first presented, 
‘the authority of the Churches in a pluralist Europe’: When A is the churches, in plural, and B 
is Europe, considered as pluralist, then it is immediately clear that this authority can be seen 
in very different perspectives; and many of the papers presented at the conference dealt with 
the different C’s – topics or contexts – where the churches may want to claim, or be 
considered as, authorities. 
One further difference between authority by expertise and authority by command is that 
you can delegate authority by command, which is not true for authority by expertise. 
Bocheński also reflected on delegated authority, which includes even more variables: Person 
A bearing authority over group B in the field of C delegates this authority to person D, maybe 
not over the whole of group B, but only over a subgroup B’, and only on a sub-field C’ – 
which gives an impression of the complexity of the subject of delegated authority. I will not 
embark into detail on this subject, let me just mention that certain Roman Catholic 
ecclesiologies consider the authority of the bishops as delegated authority received by the 
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bishop from the pope.
15
 Other ecclesiologies outside, but also some inside the Roman catholic 
church, see this differently. – My point here is that delegation of authority only works for 
authority by command. You will not become an expert through delegation by another expert. 
You may become an expert through a process called ‘learning’. Other experts (called 
‘teachers’) can be extremely helpful during this process – however, these teachers cannot just 
delegate their expertise to you. 
Second Axis: Personal, Formal and Constitutional Authority 
However, the distinction between authority by expertise and authority by command is not the 
only one relevant. Let me distinguish yet another three types of authority, which lie on a 
different level and therefore build a second axis of differentiation: 
Someone can have authority just by his or her personal charisma. People may be willing 
to believe you (authority by expertise), or follow you (authority by command), because you 
appear confident, because you show your expertise and they trust it, because you had proved 
to be reliable earlier, or because you have a dominant personality. I call this kind of authority 
‘personal’. Others may want to call it ‘charismatic’ or ‘authority by example’. – However, 
someone can also have authority because of his or her status, title, office or ministry. You 
have authority because you were appointed to fulfil a certain duty and you exercise your 
authority by the virtue of your office. People accept your authority, because you are not just 
any Tom, Dick or Harry, but because you are bishop, professor, president, chairperson, 
general secretary, appointed expert, or some such. I call this kind of authority ‘formal’. 
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The Gospels describe the authority of Jesus Christ as personal, not as formal authority, e. 
g. in Mark 1,22: ‘and they were astonished at his teaching, for he taught them as one who had 
authority, and not as the scribes.’. He is put in contrast to the scribes, who claim their 
authority from the fact that they are scribes, that they have some sort of office, that it is their 
duty to interpret the Scriptures, a job they have learnt how to do it. Jesus, on the contrary, 
does not rely on his education nor on his office, but on his ‘exousia’, which I would translate 
here as ‘personal authority’. The same is true for the apostles in the missionary context of the 
early church: Paul could not convince the Corinthians by his nice-sounding title, by the office 
ascribed to him by the Apostles’ Council, not even by the mission given to him by the risen 
Christ on the way to Damascus. He could only convince them by the message he proclaimed 
and the authenticity of his personal appearance. The situation changes, however, once they 
formed a church in Corinth considering Paul as its founder: Then, the apostle Paul also had 
formal authority, at least over those who described themselves as ‘belonging to Paul’ (1 Cor 
1,12). 
The distinction between personal and formal authority is important and well-known, yet it 
is not complete. There is a third type of authority on the same axis, which can be considered a 
sub-type of formal authority – I call it ‘constitutional’. What is meant by this? 
Although formal authority relies on an office or status, this does not mean that it is always 
and automatically accepted. However, certain authorities also have the means to push their 
will through and enforce consequences. They can not only make authoritative statements that 
people may or may not accept, but also take decisions that have consequences. The authority 
of a judge may be the most typical example. – Often, a person can assume both the ‘ordinary’ 
formal authority described above, as well as constitutional authority: A bishop can write a 
pastoral letter, which speaks with a certain formal authority; but he can also, depending on the 
structure of the church in question, take decisions, sometimes in co-operation with other 
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governing bodies, decisions that have consequences. A professor can not only teach with a 
certain authority (which can be personal, formal or both), he can also mark a student’s exam 
as passed or failed, an authoritative decision which would then have quite significant 
consequences on the further career of this student. This special kind of authority, which takes 
valid decisions with consequences, which has the means to enforce them, this kind of 
authority I call constitutional. 
The Relationship between Authority by Command and Authority by 
Expertise 
Chapters 3 and 4 of Vatican I’s Pastor aeternus represent the two different types of 
authority that I presented first, following Joseph Bocheński: the primacy of jurisdiction in 
chapter 3 ascribes supreme deontic authority to the pope, he is the leader and must be obeyed. 
The infallibility in chapter 4 ascribes supreme epistemic authority to him, he is the teacher 
and one must believe him. But as we have seen, these two authority claims depend on one 
another: one must obey because one can believe him. This illustrates the relationship between 
the two types of authority. 
Leaders with authority by command, if they want to be good leaders, must also be experts. 
Smart people do not want to follow dumb leaders. In particular, you need expertise in the field 
where you are going to be a leader. Otherwise, you will either be led by your subordinates 
without you noticing yourself, or cursed by them, or both. However, it does not work the 
other way round: Authority by expertise does not automatically make you a leader. In our 
present-day society, there are numerous experts with high epistemic authority in their field of 
knowledge, but when it comes to instructions what to do, they lack authority by command. 
Scientists speak about pollution, about the greenhouse effect, about biodiversity that is 
decreasing, about the dangers of plastic garbage for marine animals, and everybody knows 
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they are experts, everybody knows they are right – however, although they have high 
authority by expertise, they lack deontic authority that could command the necessary political, 
economic and technical changes to improve the environmental situation. 
If, however, you are a leader, and you have authority by command and hopefully authority 
by expertise, too, there is a very dangerous temptation: Whenever your epistemic authority is 
challenged or criticized, you may be tempted to exercise your deontic authority on your critic 
in order to silence him and to push your opinion through, thus avoiding any debate on 
possible counter-arguments. The German Roman Catholic theologian Max Seckler once 
defended the point of view that the Roman Catholic teaching office has all too often given in 
to this temptation.
16
 Critical theologians were disciplined by administrative means in order to 
silence them, and this proved so effective, that the epistemic authority, the supreme teaching 
authority from chapter 4 of the Pastor aeternus, was hardly ever used. As it is well known, 
there has only been one formal papal ex-cathedra definition since Vatican I, which was the 
dogma of the assumption of Mary in 1950.
17
 
In Munificentissimus Deus, Pius XII. presents the definition of the dogma as a response to 
the growing desire of the Church, both the hierarchy and the faithful. Thus, he understands 
infallibility as formally articulating a teaching that is already implicitly held by the Church. 
On the one hand, such an understanding of papal infallibility, rooted in the wider notion of 
ecclesial infallibility, can foster ecumenical progress when discussing doctrinal differences 
between denominations. On the other hand, critics of the Marian dogmas may argue that the 
wide consultation process mentioned in Munificentissimus Deus illustrates the failure of the 
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safeguards which should prevent the pope from defining a dubious teaching as a dogma.
18
 
Either way, we can state that the pope has exercised his supreme epistemic authority only 
once.
19
 
There is, however, a line of theological reasoning within the Roman Catholic Church 
which regards certain papal decisions as irreformable, although they are not ex cathedra 
decisions. The encyclical Humanae vitae by Paul VI. on the regulation of birth
20
 and the 
ecclesiastical letter Ordinatio sacerdotalis by John Paul II.
21
 are both part of the ‘ordinary 
magisterium’ – yet they are, according to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 
taught infallibly and are thus definitive.
22
 Both of them are highly controversial within, let 
alone outside the Roman Catholic Church. The former is of particular interest for our 
question: Humanae vitae explicitly states that Roman Catholic priests, in their moral teaching, 
owe obedience to the magisterium, not because of its arguments, but because it enjoys ‘a 
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sacerdotalis.html. 
22
 Congregatio pro doctrina fidei, ‘Responsum ad dubium circa doctrinam in Epist. Ap. «Ordinatio Sacerdotalis» 
traditam.’, AAS LXXXVII (1995), p. 1114. – Another instance of papal decisions that are considered definitive 
and irreformable are canonizations. They should, however, not be regarded as matters concerning faith and 
morals. 
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special light of the Holy Spirit in teaching the truth.’23 The notion of ‘obedience’ is crucial, as 
it refers to deontic authority: One reason why there was only on ex cathedra definition since 
1870 is the highly efficient use of administrative measurements, i. e. the exercise of authority 
by command. Seckler even underlines that the popes Pius XII. and Paul VI. understood the 
teaching office of theologians as a delegated teaching office:
24
 Theologians are, in their 
teaching, understood as empowered by the supreme teaching authority of the pope. As soon as 
the supreme teaching authority understands this delegation in the way that it includes not only 
the capacity of teaching, but also its content, we have authority by command silencing the 
criticism of authority by expertise – which is, according to Seckler, the case in the self-
understanding of the papal teaching office. 
Old Catholics have seen, throughout their history, their difference with the Roman 
Catholic Church as a primarily ecclesiological one. Papal supremacy of jurisdiction, with a 
lack of synodality, a lack of autonomous authority of the local churches, this was (and widely 
is) seen as the primary difference of Old Catholic self-understanding towards Roman 
Catholicism, and as a primary obstacle to full communion among these churches. Infallibility 
was considered of secondary importance – probably due to the fact, among other reasons, that 
it has only been executed once. The document ‘The Church and Ecclesial Communion’ by the 
International Roman Catholic – Old Catholic Dialogue Commission25 speaks extensively 
about primacy, jurisdiction and the role of the pope as a leader; it hardly speaks on his role as 
a teacher and does not mention infallibility at all. This led to a critical remark in a statement 
by the Swiss Old Catholic clergy conference to this document, and the dialogue commission 
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 Kirche und Kirchengemeinschaft. Bericht der Internationalen Römisch-Katholisch-Altkatholischen 
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has since worked on a second document that shall include a reflection on the epistemic side of 
papal authority. I haven’t seen this document yet, but I am eager to see it.26 
Authority by expertise made constitutional 
Still, the question of epistemic authority of the teaching office cannot be just included into the 
question of deontic authority of the bishop of Rome. And with the distinction of several types 
of authority presented here, we are now able to analyse more precisely where the problem 
lies, and how other churches like the Old Catholics could describe their alternative point of 
view when it comes to authority. 
The problem with epistemic authority in Vatican I’s Pastor aeternus is that it makes the 
authority by expertise a constitutional one. It defines that once a doctrine is taught with this ex 
cathedra authority, its truth must be accepted in the same way that the accused has to accept 
the authority of the judge: reluctantly, against his own conviction, but still as a valid 
judgement. This is problematic for several reasons. 
First, one does not gain expertise by being appointed to an office. The bearer of an office 
gains deontic authority, but not expertise. If the electoral body is clever, it will appoint a 
candidate to the office who already has a lot of expertise. However, this expertise will not 
increase just by being appointed to an office. As mentioned before, expertise is gained 
                                                 
26
 This new document will also include a section about the Marian dogmas of 1854 and 1950. This section was 
drafted by a Swiss dialogue commission, of which I am a member. The main problem of Roman Catholic – Old 
Catholic dialogue on Mariology is that the teaching of the immaculate conception and the assumption are 
formally defined dogmas by the Roman Catholic Church, while the Old Catholics have formally rejected the 
same teachings. Nowadays, ecumenists within both churches consider these dogmas rather peripheral, not 
belonging to the essentials of faith, because they rank low in a hierarchy of truths. Thus, the Swiss commission 
took the following approach: First, the Old Catholic members presented an interpretation of the theological 
issues that are covered by the two dogmas; secondly, the Roman Catholic members reflected upon this 
interpretation and stated that, in their opinion, it should not come under the anathema; thirdly, the whole 
commission stated that under these circumstances, the Marian dogmas should no longer be considered obstacles 
to unity. – On the notion of a hierarchy of truths cf. Suter, Vernetzung. 
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through a process called learning, and there is no shortcut to this process: Not through 
delegation, not through appointment to an office, not through ordination, not through 
enthronement to the See of Rome. 
Second reason why an authority by expertise that is considered constitutional is 
problematic: It contradicts every single philosophical truth theory known to humankind. 
There is no philosophical truth theory where a single authority can make a statement true by 
decision. This is obvious for a consensus theory of truth, where truth emerges in the common 
agreement in a free discourse, and it is equally obvious in a correspondence theory of truth, 
where truth is seen as the correspondence of a statement with an outside fact. And if one 
adheres to a coherence theory of truth, then a statement will stay incoherent with one’s other 
convictions about what is true even if an authority states that it doesn’t, and clearly the 
assurance of an authority that something is true does not count as evidence in an evidence 
theory of truth.
27
 
Thirdly, the bearer of an epistemic authority made constitutional, is displaced from the 
discursive exploration of controversial questions. Not only can he rise above this discourse by 
will, he will also be no longer considered part of the discourse by others. When Benedict XVI. 
resigned as pope, he was asked what he would do when he was in retirement. His answer was, 
that he would pray, think and maybe write. Of course he had written a lot already during his 
pontificate, some of his writings he understood as papal announcements, others, like his 
Regensburg speech
28
 and his Jesus books,
29
 he understood as part of an academic discourse. 
                                                 
27
 Karen Gloy, Wahrheitstheorien. Eine Einführung (Tübingen: A. Francke, 2004). 
28
 Gesine Schwan, Adel Theodor Khoury and Karl Lehmann, Benedikt XVI., Glaube und Vernunft. Die 
Regensburger Vorlesung (Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 2006). 
29
 Benedikt XVI., Jesus von Nazareth. Band 1: Von der Taufe im Jordan bis zur Verklärung (Freiburg i. Br.: 
Herder, 2007). – Benedikt XVI., Jesus von Nazareth. Band 2: Vom Einzug in Jerusalem bis zur Auferstehung 
(Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 2011). – Benedikt XVI., Jesus von Nazareth. Prolog - Die Kindheitsgeschichten 
(Freiburg i. Br.: Herder, 2012). 
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However, being the pope and bearing the highest epistemic authority on questions of faith and 
moral, he simply was not seen as a participant in an academic discourse on eye level – this 
must be seen as one of the reasons why his Regensburg speech caused so much irritation. So 
he probably wanted to state that as a retired pope, he could write without the burden of papal 
authority, but on eye level with other writers on the same topics. 
Fallible Authority in the Church and by the Church 
However, as an Old Catholic I cannot just look at the Roman Catholic Church and say thanks 
God we are different. Therefore, by rejecting infallible authority, we must provide a counter-
concept of fallible authority. So how should we understand authority, and how should it be 
exercised, when we consider it fallible? Let me propose a concept of fallible authority in ten 
theses, or ‘ten commandments to bearers of authority’: 
1. Authority is something you claim, or it is ascribed to you; it is not something you have 
or are. Admittedly, I have used the terms ‘someone has authority’ and ‘someone is an 
authority’ by myself. However, speaking more precisely, we should say: Authority is 
something you claim, a claim which others may or may not acknowledge; or it is 
something ascribed to you, and you may or may not adopt it. 
2. Authority needs acceptance, but works at the same time as a criterion of acceptance. 
Authority is, however, not a criterion of truth. If you are an expert, people may be 
willing to accept your statements without further proof, without putting them to the 
test. This acceptance, however, does not make the statement true. In order to 
epistemologically support your truth claims, you need proof, evidence, good 
arguments – although some people may be willing to accept your truth claim without 
all these, just because they trust your expertise. 
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3. Fallible means that your statements are truth claims, not more, not less. So good 
news: Fallible does not mean that you are wrong. Truth claims may be true, they may 
be disputed, you might or might not be corrected on the long run. Just as an infallible 
authority does not make a true statement ‘more true’, a fallible authority does not 
make it ‘less true’. 
4. While your office does not give you higher expertise, it gives you higher responsibility. 
You need a certain expertise to fulfil your task in the office; however, there probably 
are people with more expertise than you, some of them have no office at all, some 
might be your subordinates. People in office with high responsibility have their 
experts to support them. Politicians have expert commissions, economic leaders have 
advisory boards, and bishops have theologians. While these supporting experts may 
have more expertise, the holder of an authoritative office will bear a higher 
responsibility. The reason is clear: The office brings with it some authority by 
command, in many cases constitutional authority with immediate consequences. 
5. Fallibility implies that others are fallible, too. In the field of epistemic authority, there 
often are several authorities defending rather different and at times contradicting truth 
claims. Therefore, if you are in a position of authority, choosing the right advisor is 
crucial. However, even the right advisor is fallible, so you cannot delegate your own 
responsibility to a better expert, hoping this can guarantee that you do nothing wrong. 
6. Never use your authority by command in order to silence your opponent. Instead, 
argue. In the course of such an argument, it is very natural to refer to authority by 
expertise, either of a well-known expert, or your own.
30
 However, if you use your 
                                                 
30
 We all know namedropping arguments like ‘as expert so-and-so has written in the second volume of his 
standard work’ or self-adulating arguments like ‘as I have already mentioned in my lecture at this-or-that famous 
institution.’ They refer to authority by expertise, they are sometimes relevant, sometimes a sign that you are 
faithful to your sources, sometimes a little ridiculous, but very normal and nothing to worry about. It is the 
reference to authority by command that is problematic in a discourse. 
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authority by command in order to fight your opponent, if you sabotage his career in 
order to make his arguments less heard, if you use your influence to prevent him from 
publishing his ideas in renowned journals, this would be an abuse of deontic authority. 
7. Even the rather uneducated Christians have a sense of truth in questions of faith. 
Some call this sense of truth ‘authority’, I don’t. I call it ‘primary knowledge’ – which 
is not the same as ‘basic knowledge’ or ‘elementary knowledge’. Rather, primary 
knowledge is first-hand knowledge from one’s own experience. The primary 
knowledge of all Christians about the Christian faith is like the knowledge of a native 
speaker about his or her mother tongue: They may not be able to explain this or that 
grammar rule, but they speak their language fluently. They even recognise mistakes, 
without being able to tell what rule is being violated. It is the North American 
Lutheran theologian George Lindbeck who strongly underlined the theological 
competence of Christian lay people in the sense of native speakers of the Christian 
language.
31
 Theologians are, according to Lindbeck, like grammarians who analyse 
the underlying principles of the Christian language. This thought shows a new aspect 
to the notion of the sensus fidelium, which must not be seen as a consensus on second-
order statements of Christian teaching, but on first-hand knowledge of Christian faith. 
Thus, the sensus fidelium is the concordant practice of faith by competent ‘native 
speaking’ believers.32 
                                                 
31
 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine. Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. 25th anniversary 
ed. with a new introduction by Bruce D. Marshall and a new afterword by the author (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2009). On my own interpretation of Lindbeck, cf. Adrian Suter, ‘Ecumenical and Interreligious 
Dialogue: Lindbeck’s Cultural-Linguistic Model’, IKZ-bios 1 (2014), pp. 41–64. 
32
 ‘A competent speaker of a language is, according to Lindbeck, one who can easily communicate within the 
social group who speaks the language in question. This is, of course, a recursive definition: competent speakers 
are those who are considered to be competent speakers by other competent speakers. Yet, it has an empirical 
foundation: as soon as one finds a socio-cultural group sharing the same language, defining itself by referring to 
this language, one can also identify competent speakers of this language.’ Suter, Ecumenical, at pp. 57–58. Cf. 
Lindbeck, Nature, at pp. 99–100. 
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8. If you abstain from exercising authority, you may actually enhance it. If you claim 
epistemic authority, expertise is crucial. Fallible authority means that your expertise is 
still imperfect, and you can and should expand it through learning. This can not only 
be done in interaction with an expert with higher expertise than yours acting as your 
teacher, but also in interaction with someone whose expertise does not match yours, 
but who can stimulate processes of learning. A grammarian has to listen to native 
speakers in order to learn the grammar of a language, even if those native speakers 
cannot explain the grammar to him. Similarly, an expert in the field of Christian faith 
must listen to native Christian speakers, even if they cannot explain their theological 
concepts to him. Nevertheless, the expert may recognise these concepts, analyse them 
and learn something by exploring them. If the expert jumps to teaching too quickly, 
this may undermine his or her own learning processes. 
9. Having said that, one must underline: Even a fallible authority is still an authority. It 
should not be denied, but exercised in the most responsible way. The awareness that 
one’s own authority is fallible should not lead to its denial, disdain or neglect.33 On the 
contrary, an expert should teach, and a superior should instruct. They should, however, 
exercise their authority responsibly, which means they should teach and instruct in 
ways that open doors, not close them. Fallible epistemic authority will give the debate 
a certain direction, but should not close it. Its truth claims may become obsolete by the 
progress of knowledge. Thus, truth claims by a fallible authority are not irreformable – 
people exercising authority should be aware of this. 
                                                 
33
 When I became a parish priest 18 years ago, at the first meeting of the parish council, we were discussing 
some question, I cannot remember what it was. What I can remember is that, at a certain stage of the discussion, 
the president asked ‘well, what does our parish priest think?’ Everybody was looking in my direction, I said 
something, and they all agreed. I had become an authority over night. And even if I was very well aware of my 
fallibility and my lack of experience as a young priest, I still had to deal with the fact that I was an authority. 
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10. Fallible deontic authority may close certain opportunities for the person who follows 
this authority, but it should always open new ones. In the case of deontic authority, 
stepping back from earlier decisions may not be enough. Authoritative instructions 
and commands can prove inadequate on the long run, but they may have already had 
significant consequences that will not disappear when the decision is taken back. 
Therefore, fallible authority must be aware of the consequences of its decisions, and 
whenever it closes a door, it should open a new one. 
Admittedly, this article as a whole and these ten theses on fallible authority are aimed at the 
exercise of authority in the church ad intram. However, the differentiations proposed in this 
article may also enlighten the analysis of the situation of the churches in today’s pluralist 
Europe: In a secularised society, churches lack formal authority ad extram. They cannot rely 
on their status or office. They are not in a position of command, neither is their expertise 
unchallenged. The churches ad extram are like Paul when he first arrived in Corinth, not like 
when he wrote his letters to the church he founded there. In the fields of politics, social 
sciences, economics etc., the churches’ expertise is limited. Of course, churches are called to 
gain or enhance their expertise in these fields, but they will never be considered better experts 
than the secular ones. So where lies their authority, where could they claim authority that has 
a chance of being accepted, or where is this pluralist Europe likely to ascribe authority to the 
churches? – The key point, in my opinion, is to discover the relevance of the expertise 
churches have for the situation of a pluralist Europe: They must find out, and make 
transparent, in how far their expertise in questions of faith, of the role of sacred writings and 
normative traditions, of belonging and identity, of inculturation and dialogue, are relevant for 
Europe today. 
To conclude, the concept of fallible authority may be nothing new to some readers. This is 
because many of them, being in a position of authority themselves, speak the language of 
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fallible authority like their mother tongue. What I tried to do in this article is analyse this 
language of fallible authority like a grammarian. The grammarian may not be able to teach 
new language skills, because many readers already have them, but he might be able to show 
that the language follows certain rules and that these rules make sense. 
 
